

Political Science 430  
Spring 2002  
Office: Tower 905  
Office Hours: TuTh 3:00-4:15  
and by appointment

Proseminar in American Politics  
Richard Pacelle  
Phone: 516-6745 voice mail  
Seminar: Tuesday 6:55-9:35  
email: pacelle@umsl.edu

### **Plan and Purpose of the Seminar**

This is the graduate introduction to the field of American Politics. We will survey the waterfront of a number of the major research areas within American Politics. The primary objective of the seminar is to provide an exposure to the major approaches and theories in the major substantive research areas. In each area, we will consider the evolution of the approaches to the substantive area, the classics, and the recent research. We will examine the dominant paradigms, if they exist, in each area. The seminar is divided into three general sections: political behavior, institutions, and the macro-level dynamics of the American political process. This is an approaches and issue seminar, examining the scope and methods of American politics. This seminar will include a survey of approaches and materials on politics in the American political system. The purpose of the seminar is to examine some of the important questions in American politics and a variety of theoretical constructs and methodologies and broad approaches to studying individual behavior and institutions. We will read some of the classics in the various fields, as well as some recent scholarship and research and will consider some of the major controversies. Political behavior includes research on individual and collective choice, political participation, voting and elections, parties and interest groups. The study of institutions will concentrate on Congress, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court. In the last section of the seminar, we will examine the dynamics of the system and notions of institutional level change. In this last section, we will consider American political economy. We will consider the theory and practice of American government and how they intersected in Election 2000. In addition, we will consider the new practical realities of American government in the wake of September 11. The early Bush Administration will provide us with a practical example of a number of the topics in the seminar.

This seminar is designed to fulfill two basic purposes: to provide a basic familiarity with the political process and to analyze critically the literature as a body of scholarship. The focus of our discussion for each topic will be the various approaches and the development of research in that area. That will include concerns with the foundations of the research and the remaining work that needs to be done in the various research areas. Seminar members will be responsible for reading the designated set of materials. We will then integrate these readings into a general examination of that research area. Obviously, we can only paint with the broadest strokes in this seminar. American politics is a very broad subject. Indeed, each of the substantive areas that we will examine can be the subject of its own seminar.

### **Seminar Requirements**

The seminar will rely heavily upon reading, discussion, and participation. We want to analyze critically the various topics and the approaches and methodologies. There is a great deal of reading

in the course. I expect members of the seminar to contribute to the discussions. That participation will play an important role in the final grade. There are three sets of formal requirements for the seminar: agenda papers, research questions, and a take home final examination. Each member of the seminar will be responsible for giving special attention to two of the weekly topics by preparing short agenda papers (5-7 pages) on the relevant topics and helping to lead the seminar discussion during each of those weeks. The agenda papers may be a critique of some of the literature on the topic or an analysis of one of the substantive issues within that research area. The agenda paper can compare two, three, or maybe four of that week's readings, critique the methodology or the approach, or attempt to synthesize a few of the readings into a broader framework. You should not try to incorporate all of that week's readings in to the paper. The agenda papers are due before the seminar session the day that topic is discussed. There are absolutely NO EXCEPTIONS to this policy. If the agenda paper is not ready for that week's session, it will not be accepted. Each member of the seminar is also asked to submit one (or more) questions each week to help guide the discussion. The questions can examine the methods, the central focus of the area, compare the implications of one or more of the readings, or some unresolved issues. The questions can also compare the readings of that week's topic with any of the previous weeks' readings. Those questions should be handed in before the seminar each week. You can email them to me or put them in my mailbox. A final, take home examination is also required. The questions will be handed out the last class session, April 30. It will be due the following Wednesday, May 7 at 4:00 P.M. Any late finals will be penalized. The final will involve preliminary type questions that ask members of the seminar to consider some of the macro-issues and approaches and compare some of the readings. Because there is no paper requirement in the seminar, there will be no incompletes. Grading policies will be explained more fully in class.

## INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW

### **I. American Politics and Social Science: An Overview (January 15)**

*The Federalist Papers* (numbers 10, 47, and 51).

William Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986), chaps. 2, 4, 7, 11.

Recommended:

Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations* (1994).

Ada Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, revised edition (1993).

Herbert Weisberg, ed. *Political Science: The Science of Politics* (1986).

Ada Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (1983).

## **II. Major Themes and Classic Approaches (January 22)**

David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (1951), chapters 1-3, 16.

E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (1960), chapters 1, 3, 8.

Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" *American Political Science Review* (1962): 947-952.

Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress" *American Political Science Review* (1963): 45-56.

Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities* (1982), chapters 1-2, the introductions to each Part, and the Epilogue.

Recommended:

Alexis de Toqueville, *Democracy in America*.

Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1929).

David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965).

Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (1961).

C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (1956).

Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Use of Politics* (1967).

Peter Bachrach, *A Theory of Democratic Elitism* (1967).

Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955).

Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956).

Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action* (1971).

Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda*

*Building*, second edition (1983).

Robert Eyestone, *From Social Issues to Public Policy* (1978).

Charles Elder and Roger Cobb, *The Political Uses of Symbols* (1983).

Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981).

Ronald Kahn, *The Supreme Court & Constitutional Theory: 1953-1993* (1994).

### **III. Rational Choice and Neo-Institutionalism (January 29)**

Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), chapters 1-2.

Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970), chapters 1-3.

William Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions" *74 American Political Science Review* (1980): 432-446.

James March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life" *78 American Political Science Review* (1984): 734-749.

David Robertson, "Politics and the Past: History, Behavioralism, and the Return to Institutionalism in American Political Science" in *Engaging the Past: The Uses of History Across the Social Sciences*, ed. Eric Monkkonen (1994), pp. 113-153.

Bert Rockman, "The New Institutionalism and the Old Institutions" in *New Perspectives on American Politics*, ed. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (1994), pp. 143-161.

John Aldrich, "Rational Choice Theory and the Study of American Politics" in *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations*, ed. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (1994), pp. 208-233.

Recommended:

Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957).

Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1957).

James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (1962).

William Riker, *Liberalism Against Populism* (1982).

Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (1984).

James Enelow and Melvin Hinich, *The Spatial Theory of Voting* (1984).

Kenneth Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach" 1 *Journal of Theoretical Politics* (1989): 131-147.

Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics* (1970).

Steven Brams, *Game Theory and Politics* (1985).

William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962).

Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict* (1992).

Steven Brams, *Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, & Strategy* (1985).

Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions* (1997).

Peter Ordeshook, *Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction* (1986).

Donald Searing, "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism" 85 *American Political Science Review* (1991): 1239-1260.

Jon Elster, ed., *Rational Choice* (1986).

James March, ed., *Rediscovering Institutions* (1989).

John Jackson, ed., *Institutions in American Society* (1990).

William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (1973).

Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (1984).

Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, *Powers of Theory* (1985).

Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action" 92 *American Political Science Review* (1998): 1-22

Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *The Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (1994).

Elaine Swift and David Brady, "Common Ground: Histories and Theories of American Politics" in *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations*, ed. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (1994), pp. 83-104.

Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960).

Andrew Schotter, *The Economic Theory of Social Institutions* (1981).

Barry Weingast, "Rational Choice Perspectives on Institutions" in *A New Political Science Handbook*, ed. Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1996).

## **POLITICAL BEHAVIOR**

### **IV. Mass Behavior: Participation, Public Opinion, and Voting (February 5)**

John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (1992).

Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns* (1991), chaps. 1-3.

Edward Carmines and James Stimson, "The Two Faces of Issue Voting" *American Political Science Review* (1980): 78-91.

Recommended:

Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (1960).

Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (1954).

V.O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (1966)

Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (1976).

Morris Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (1981).

Benjamin Page, *Choices and Echoes in American National Elections* (1978).

Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (1972).

Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America* (1993).

Raymond Wolfinger and Stephen Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (1980).

Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, *The New American Voter* (1996).

David Sears, Richard Lau, Tom Tyler, and Harris Allen, "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitude and Voting" 74 *American Political Science Review* (1980): 670-684.

Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal-Conservative Self-Identifications" 25 *American Journal of Political Science* (1981): 617-645.

John Citrin and Donald Green, "The Self-Interest Motive in American Public Opinion" 3 *Research in Micropolitics* (1990): 1-28.

William Lyons and Robert Alexander, "A Tale of Two Electorates: Generational Replacement and the Decline of Voting in Presidential Elections" 62 *Journal of Politics* (2000): 1014-1034.

Brad Gomez and J. Matthew Wilson, "Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate: A Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution" 45 *American Journal of Political Science* (2001): 899-914.

Robert Erikson, John McIver, and Gerald Wright, "State Political Culture and Public Opinion" 81 *American Political Science Review* (1987): 797-814.

Stanley Feldman, "Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior" 26 *American Journal of Political Science* (1982): 446-466.

Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (1995).

Philip Converse, "The Nature of Mass Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (1964), pp. 206-261.

Donald Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case" 11 *British Journal of Political Science* (1981): 129-161.

Michael MacKuen, "Exposure to Information, Belief Integration, and Individual Responsiveness to Agenda Change" 78 *American Political Science Review* (1984): 372-391.

Barry Burden and David Kimball, "A New Approach to the Study of Ticket-Splitting" 92 *American*

*Political Science Review* (1998): 533-542.

R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler "Economics, Entitlements, and Social Issues: Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election" 42 *American Journal of Political Science* (1998): 1349-1364.

William Jacoby, "Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending" 44 *American Journal of Political Science* (2000): 750-767.

Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (1992).

George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine MacDonald, "A Directional Theory of Voting" 83 *American Political Science Review* (1989): 93-121.

Michael Margolis, "From Confusion to Confusion: Issues and the American Voter" 71 *American Political Science Review* (1977): 31-43.

William Bianco, "Different Paths to the Same Result: Rational Choice, Political Psychology, and Impression Formation in Campaigns" 42 *American Journal of Political Science* (1998): 1061-1081.

M. Stephen Weatherford, "Economic Voting and the 'Symbolic' Politics Argument: A Reinterpretation and Synthesis" 77 *American Political Science Review* (1983): 158-175.

Barry Burden, "Deterministic and Probabilistic Voting Models" 41 *American Journal of Political Science* (1997): 1150-1169.

Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, "Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers" 42 *American Journal of Political Science* (1998): 1180-1199.

Stephen Bennett and David Resnick, "The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the United States" 34 *American Journal of Political Science* (1990): 771-802.

Ray Teixeria, *The Disappearing American Voter* (1992).

Carol Cassel and Robert Luskin, "Simple Explanations of Turnout Decline" 82 *American Political Science Review* (1988): 1321-1330.

William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting" 62 *American Political Science Review* (1968): 25-42.

John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis" 68 *American Political Science Review* (1974): 525-536.

Richard Timpone, "Structure, Behavior, and Voting Turnout in the United States" 92 *American Political Science Review* (1998): 145-158.

## **V. Elections, Parties, and Macro-Level Change (February 12)**

James Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, revised edition (1983), chaps. 1-3, 13-14.

Peter Nardulli, "The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political Change" 89 *American Political Science Review* (1995): 10-22.

Edward Carmines and James Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (1989), chaps. 1, 7, 8.

Michael MacKuen, Robert Erikson, and James Stimson, "Macropartisanship" 83 *American Political Science Review* (1989): 1125-1142.

Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Sanders, "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate" 60 *Journal of Politics* (1998): 634-652.

William Lasser, "The Supreme Court in Periods of Critical Realignment" *Journal of Politics*, 47 (1985): 1174-1187.

Recommended:

V.O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections" 17 *Journal of Politics* (1955): 3-18.

V.O. Key, "Secular Realignment and the Party System" 19 *Journal of Politics* (1957): 198-210.

Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (1970).

John Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America* (1995).

Philip Converse, *The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort Analyzing Party Identification* (1976).

Jerome Clubb, William Flanagan, and Nancy Zingale, *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* (1980).

Larry Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996" 44 *American Journal of Political Science* (2000): 35-50.

David Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (1988).

Barbara Deckard Sinclair, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 71 (1977): 940-953

Paul Allen Beck, "A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment" in *The Politics of Future Citizens*, ed. Richard Niemi (1974).

Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe" 59 *American Political Science Review* (1965): 7-28.

Martin Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1988* (1990).

John Gates, *The Supreme Court and Partisan Realignment* (1992).

Samuel Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (1964).

R. Michael Alvarez, *Issues and Information in Presidential Elections* (1997).

John Petrocik, *Party Coalitions: Realignments and the Decline of the New Deal Party System* (1981).

Richard Funston, "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections" 69 *American Political Science Review* (1975): 795-811.

David Adamany, "Legitimacy, Realignment Elections, and the Supreme Court" *Wisconsin Law Review*, (1973): 790-846.

David Brady with Joseph Stewart, "Congressional Party Realignment and Transformation of Public Policy in Three Realignment Eras" 26 *American Journal of Political Science* (1982): 333-360.

Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (1915).

Warren Miller, "Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics" 85 *American Political Science Review* (1991): 557-568.

## **VI. Interest Groups (February 19)**

Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in *The New American Political System*, ed. by Anthony King (1978): 87-124.

Jeffrey Berry, *The Interest Group Society*, third edition (1997), chaps. 1, 4.

Jack Walker, "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America" 77 *American Political Science Review* (1983): 390-406.

Marc Galanter, "Why the `Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change" *Law & Society Review* 9 (1974): 95-160.

John Heinz, Edward Laumann, Robert Salisbury, and Robert Nelson, "Inner Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems" 52 *Journal of Politics* (1990): 356-390.

John Heinz, Edward Laumann, Robert Salisbury, and Robert Nelson, *The Hollow Core* (1993), chap. 12.

Marie Hojnacki, "Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone" 41 *American Journal of Political Science* (1997): 61-87.

Recommended:

David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (1951).

Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965).

Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (1963).

Robert Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups" 13 *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1969): 1-32.

Terry Moe, *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups* (1980).

Robert Salisbury, John Heinz, Edward Laumann, and Robert Nelson, "Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition" 81 *American Political Science Review* (1987): 1217-1234.

Kay Lehman Schlozman and John Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy* (1986).

David Knoke, *Organizing for Collective Action: The Political Economies of Associations* (1990).

Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer, and Oran Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*

(1977).

David Lowery and Virginia Gray, "The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States" 39 *American Journal of Political Science* (1995): 1-29.

John Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress* (1996).

Jack Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements* (1991).

Martin Smith, *Pressure Power & Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States* (1993).

Steven Balla and John Wright, "Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy" 45 *American Journal of Political Science* (2001): 799-812.

Marie Hojnacki and David Kimball, "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress" 92 *American Political Science Review* (1998): 775-790.

Michael Hayes, "The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theory and an Alternative Typology" 40 *Journal of Politics* (1987): 134-181.

Donald Songer and Reginald Sheehan, "Interest Group Success in the Courts: *Amicus* Participation in the Supreme Court" *Political Research Quarterly* 46 (1993): 339-354.

Dennis Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement* (1991)

David Lowery and Virginia Gray, "The Dominance of Institutions in Interest Representation: A Test of Seven Explanations" 42 *American Journal of Political Science* (1998): 231-255.

Gregory Caldeira and John Wright "Amicus Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?" *Journal of Politics* 52 (1990): 782-806.

Andrew McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America" 17 *British Journal of Political Science* (1987): 129-147.

John Mark Hansen, "The Political Economy of Group Membership" 79 *American Political Science Review* (1985): 79-96.

Kevin McGuire, "Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success" *Journal of Politics* 57 (1995): 187-196.

Terry Moe, "A Calculus of Group Membership" 24 *American Journal of Political Science* (1980): 593-632.

Reginald Sheehan, William Mishler, and Donald Songer, "Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court" *American Political Science Review* 86 (1992): 464-471.

Hank Jenkins-Smith, Gilbert St. Clair, and Brian Woods, "Explaining Change in Policy Subsystems: Analysis of Coalition Stability and Defection over Time" 35 *American Journal of Political Science* (1991): 851-880.

Ian Maitland, "Interest Groups and Economic Growth Rates" 47 *Journal of Politics* (1985): 44-58.

Joseph Kobylka, "A Court Related Context for Group Litigation: Libertarian Groups and Obscenity" 49 *Journal of Politics* (1987): 1061-1078.

## INSTITUTIONS

### **VII. Congress: Representation and Micro-Level Behavior (February 26)**

David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974), chap. 1.

Richard Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (1978), chaps. 1, 7.

John Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, third edition (1989), chaps. 9-10.

Gary Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, fourth edition (1997), chaps. 3, 6.

David Brady and Barbara Sinclair, "Building Majorities for Policy Changes in the House of Representatives" 46 *Journal of Politics* (1984): 1033-1060.

Larry Bartels, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup" 85 *American Political Science Review* (1991): 457-474.

Recommended:

Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress" 57 *American Political Science Review* (1963): 45-57.

Richard Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees* (1973).

- Aage Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (1973).
- Donald Matthews and James Stimson, *Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House of Representatives* (1975).
- Morris Fiorina, *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies* (1974).
- Barbara Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking* (1995).
- Morris Fiorina and David Rohde, eds., *Home Style and Washington Work* (1989).
- Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (1987).
- Herbert Asher and Herbert Weisberg, "Voting Change in Congress: Some Dynamic Perspectives on an Evolutionary Process" *22 American Journal of Political Science* (1978): 391-425.
- Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, second edition (1983).
- Samuel Patterson and Gregory Caldeira, "Party Voting in the United States Congress" *18 British Journal of Political Science* (1988): 111-131.
- Arthur Denzau, William Riker, and Kenneth Shepsle, "Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style" *79 American Political Science Review* (1985): 1117-1151.
- Keith Krehbiel and Douglas Rivers, "Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration" *52 Journal of Politics* (1990): 548-578.
- Gary Jacobson, "The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives" *31 American Journal of Political Science* (1987): 126-141.
- Robert Weissberg, "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress" *72 American Political Science Review* (1978): 535-547.
- Kim Quail Hill and Patricia Hurley, "Dyadic Representation Reappraised" *43 American Journal of Political Science* (1999): 109-137.
- Gary Jacobson, "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986" *83 American Political Science Review* (1989): 773-793.
- John Coleman and Paul Manna, "Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of

Democracy" 62 *Journal of Politics* (2000): 757-789.

Paul Herrnson, *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington*, second edition (1998).

Arthur Denzau and Michael Munger, "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented" 80 *American Political Science Review* (1986): 89-107.

Keith Krehbiel, "Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z" 39 *American Journal of Political Science* (1995): 906-923.

Gerald Wright and Michael Berkman, "Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections" 80 *American Political Science Review* (1986): 567-590.

### **VIII. Congress: Institutional and Macro-Level Analysis (March 5)**

Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization* (1991), chaps. 4, 7.

Barry Weingast, "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms" 23 *American Journal of Political Science* (1979): 245-262.

David King, "The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions" 88 *American Political Science Review* (1994): 48-62.

Calvin Mouw and Michael MacKuen, "The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics" 86 *American Political Science Review* (1992): 87-105.

Forrest Maltzman, *Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of Congress* (1997), chaps. 2, 7.

Richard Hall, *Participation in Congress* (1996), chaps. 2-3, 9.

John Gilmour, "Summits and Stalemates: Bipartisan Negotiations in the Postreform Era" in *The Post-Reform Congress*, ed. Roger Davidson (1991), pp. 233-256.

Recommended:

Richard Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees* (1973).

Donald Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (1960).

Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*, second edition (1989).

Barbara Sinclair, *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate* (1989).

Joseph Cooper and David Brady, "Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress" *75 American Political Science Review* (1981): 988-1006.

R.Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (1990).

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Matthew McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation* (1991).

John Hibbing and Elizabeth Thiess-Morse, *Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward American Political Institutions* (1995).

Matthew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., *Congress: Structure and Policy* (1987).

Steven Smith and Christopher Deering, *Committees in Congress* (1984).

Barbara Sinclair, *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress* (1997).

David Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House* (1991).

Andrew Martin, "Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers" *95 American Political Science Review* (2001): 379-396.

Stanley Bach and Steven Smith, *Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules* (1988).

Barbara Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment, 1925-1978* (1982).

John Hardin, "Advocacy versus Certainty: The Dynamics of Committee Jurisdiction Concentration" *60 Journal of Politics* (1998): 374-397.

Keith Krehbiel and Douglas Rivers, "The Analysis of Committee Power: An Adaptation to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage" *32 American Journal of Political Science* (1988): 1151-1174.

Sarah Binder, *Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress* (1997).

John Aldrich and David Rohde, "The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee" *62 Journal of Politics* (January 2000): 1-33.

Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power" *81*

*American Political Science Review* (1987): 85-104.

Nelson Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives" 62 *American Political Science Review* (1968): 144-168.

Steven Smith, *Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate* (1989).

Richard Hall and C. Lawrence Evans, "The Power of Subcommittees" 52 *Journal of Politics* (1990): 335-355.

Burdett Loomis, "Congressional Careers and Party Leadership in the Contemporary House of Representatives" 28 *American Journal of Political Science* (1984): 180-202.

Kenneth Bickers and Robert Stein, "The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era" 62 *Journal of Politics* (2000): 1070-1086.

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Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton* (1997), chaps. 1-2.

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B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, "The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy" 85 *American Political Science Review* (1991): 801-828.

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Jeffrey Segal, "Separation of Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and the Courts" 91 *American Political Science Review* (1997): 28-44.

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Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, *The President in the Legislative Arena* (1990), chapters 2, 3, 9.

Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* (1998), chap. 2, 7 and skim one of the following 3, 4, 5.

Recommended:

William Eskridge, *Dynamic Statutory Interpretation* (1994).

Pablo Spiller and Rafael Gely, "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor Decisions, 1949-1988" 23 *RAND Journal of Economics* (1992): 463-492.

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## **POLITICS AT THE MACRO LEVEL**

### **XIII. The Dynamics of American Politics (April 16)**

Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (1993).

John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, third edition (1995), chaps. 5-9.

Andrew McFarland, "Interest Groups and Political Time: Cycles in America" 21 *British Journal of Political Science* (1991): 257-284.

Recommended:

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B. Guy Peters and Brian Hogwood, "In Search of the Issue Attention Cycle" 47 *Journal of Politics* (1985): 238-253.

Paul Wahlbeck, "The Life of the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal Change" 59 *Journal of Politics* (1997): 778-802.

Albert Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action* (1982).

Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities* (1982).

Richard Pacelle, *The Transformation of the Supreme Court's Agenda: From the New Deal to the Reagan Administration* (1991)

Bryan Jones, Frank Baumgartner, and Jeffrey Talbert, "The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress" 87 *American Political Science Review* (1993): 657-671.

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David Robertson and Dennis Judd, *The Development of American Public Policy: The Structure of Policy Restraint* (1989).

Lee Epstein and Joseph Kobylka, *The Supreme Court and the Legal Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty* (1992).

Arthur Schlesinger, *The Cycles of American History* (1986).

#### **XIV. Macro Politics (April 23)**

Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, revised edition (1979), chaps. 1-3.

Bryan Jones, *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics* (1994), chaps. 8-10.

Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, *Politics by Other Means* (1990), chaps. 1, 6.

James Stimson, Michael MacKuen, and Robert Erikson, "Dynamic Representation" 89 *American Political Science Review* (1995): 543-565.

Paul Quirk, "The Cooperative Resolution of Policy Conflict" 83 *American Political Science Review* (1989): 905-921.

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Gerald Rosenberg, *The Hollow Hope* (1991)

Donald Phillip Green, "The Price Elasticity of Mass Preferences" 86 *American Political Science Review* (1992): 128-148.

Thomas Schelling, *Micro-Motives and Macrobbehavior* (1978).

Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (1977).

Avanash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, *Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics and Everyday Life* (1991).

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Peter Ordeshook and Thomas Schwartz, "Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes" 81 *American Political Science Review* (1987): 179-199.

Frank Baumgartner, Bryan Jones, and Michael MacLeod, "The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions" 62 *Journal of Politics* (2000): 321-349.

Robert Durr, John Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht, "Explaining Congressional Approval" 41 *American Journal of Political Science* (1997): 175-207.

Gregory Caldeira, "Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court" 80 *American Political Science Review* (1986): 1209-1227.

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Charles Franklin and Liane Kosaki, "Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion" 83 *American Political Science Review* (1989): 751-771.

William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan "The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions" 87 *American Political Science Review* (1993): 87-101.

Robert Erikson, Gerald Wright, and John McIver, *Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States* (1993).

Robert Durr, "What Moves Policy Sentiment?" 87 *American Political Science Review* (1993): 158-170.

Stuart Elaine MacDonald and George Rabinowitz, "The Dynamics of Structural Realignment" 81 *American Political Science Review* (1987): 775-796.

Christopher Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending" 39 *American Journal of Political Science* (1995): 981-1000.

Kim Quaile Hill and Angela Hinton-Andersson, "Pathways of Representation: A Causal Analysis of Public Opinion-Policy Linkages" 39 *American Journal of Political Science* (1995): 924-935.

## **XV. Political Economy (April 30)**

Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy* (1995), chaps. 1, 6, 9.

Douglas North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (1990), chapters 1-2, 4, 9-14.

Charles Lindblom, "The Market as Prison" 44 *Journal of Politics* (1982): 324-336.

Michael MacKuen, Robert Erikson, and James Stimson, "Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy" 86 *American Political Science Review* (1992): 598-611.

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Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (1953).

James Alt and K. Alec Chrystal, *Political Economics* (1983).

Douglas Hibbs, *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics* (1987).

William Keech, *Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy* (1995).

John Freeman, *Democracy and Markets: The Politics of Mixed Economies* (1989).

David Vogel, *Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America* (1989).

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Henry Chappell and William Keech, "A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance" 79 *American Political Science Review* (1985): 10-27.

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